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Abstract
Entrepreneurs invest a large share of their financial wealth in a single
business that they personally manage. Despite the large risk implied by
this undiversified investment they do not seem to require any extra return
on a diversified public equity index. In light of the large public equity
premium this fact poses a new asset pricing puzzle. In the present paper
I use a quantitative model to explore the issue and find that the choice to
be entrepreneurs can be rationalized even with a negative private equity
premium when the full return on entrepreneurial investment is properly
accounted for.
Keywords: Private equity, learning, portfolio choice, occupational choice,
life-cycle.
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1 Introduction
Entrepreneurs on average invest about 40 percent of their financial wealth in
business assets, often in a single firm that they also manage. At the same
time the idiosyncratic risk of a single firm is likely to be very large. In light of
the large public equity premium one would expect that entrepreneurs require
a substantial premium over public equity to hold such undiversified positions
in business assets. Yet, in a recent study, Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen
(2002) find that the return on an index of private equity they construct does
not exceed that on the public equity index. This fact has come to be known
as the private equity premium puzzle. 1The two authors go on suggesting that
given heterogeneity, while some entrepreneurs may be earning a proper return
to compensate them for the idiosyncratic risk of their business, others must be
earning even less, making the choice to become entrepreneurs even more puzzling
for them. In the present paper I construct a fully specified life-cycle occupation
and portfolio choice model and use it to explore the two issues mentioned above.
The main result of the paper is that the choice to become an entrepreneur
and hold undiversified portfolios for the typical entrepreneur can be justified
in the presence of a very small or even negative excess return on the financial
investment in the business over a diversified stock, provided this investment is
small and the full return to starting the business, including the one on human
capital is properly taken into account. The paper also provides estimates of the
return on the value weighted index of private equity, a measure that more closely
1Recently Kartashova (2009) performed the same exercise as Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jørgensen (2002) on a longer data-set that includes up to the 2007 issue of the Survey of
Consumer Finance and found a small positive premium. This is still smaller though than the
premium one would expect from standard theoretical considerations.
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reflects the behavior of the largest firms. These estimates are in the order of
ten percent or more, confirming previous back-of-the-envelope calculations and
pointing to the need of further research on this subject.
The model developed here is set in a partial equilibrium framework and is
populated by life-cycle agents that go through the stages of working life and
retirement. During working life agents make an occupational choice: at each
point in time they decide between working for pay and being self-employed. This
choice is always reversible so that it is repeated in every period until retirement.
Workers supply their labor in exchange for a wage and choose how much to
consume and how much to save in a risky financial asset. Entrepreneurs receive
earnings from their business, choose their optimal consumption and saving plan
and decide how to allocate their wealth between equity in their business and
the financial asset. Three features characterize the way entrepreneurial activity
is modeled. First I assume that there is a component of the return to a private
firm that is fixed in the course of its life and not known at the time the entry
decision is made. Agents make the decision to enter self-employment based on
a noisy signal of this fixed component. After that they learn about it over time
by applying Bayes’ rule to the realized stochastic returns. Second, exogenous
imperfections in financial markets force the entrepreneur to finance the private
business out of his own wealth and a minimum equity requirement is assumed.
Finally the process for entrepreneurial earnings is highly correlated with the
process for the return on equity invested in the private business; this is meant
to capture the fact that most entrepreneurs work in the same business where
they invest their wealth.
The model is simulated and its quantitative properties analyzed. The main
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result of the analysis is that it is possible to rationalize the choice to become
an entrepreneur even with a negative expected premium on the financial invest-
ment. This occurs for several reasons. First the occupational choice is always
reversible and the amount of business assets needed to start a firm is small.
This implies that the amount of human and financial wealth that is put at risk
upon entry is small, which reduces the required premium. Second, the dynamic
structure of the model allows the potential entrepreneur to receive two forms
of compensation for this choice that are not directly measured in the financial
return on the initial investment. One comes from the fact that a majority of
switching workers received a negative earnings shock in the labor market so
that becoming self-employed directly improves the return on their human capi-
tal. The second one is a consequence of the information structure of the model
and the option to quit. The would be entrepreneur does not know the exact
quality of the business he may run, however he knows that if it turns out to be
very good he will enjoy a substantial return premium on the investment and if it
turns out to be bad he has the option to quit. The large dispersion in the fixed
unknown component of project quality gives a substantial value to the infor-
mation about business returns that the agent gets by entering, so that he may
choose self-employment even if the expected return on the financial investment
is below the one on the stock upon entry and possibly for a few periods on.
The model also allows to give an estimate of the return on an index of private
equity defined as the value weighted average return to individual firms. The
figures obtained range from 8 to 20 percent. This finding stems from the fact
that, given the large concentration of business equity, the value weighted return
is dominated by the allocation choice of mature entrepreneurs holding large and
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well established firms. For those entrepreneurs the allocation problem reduces
to a standard portfolio choice problem and given the substantial risk of holding
private equity this needs to pay a large premium on the financial asset to justify
their undiversified choice.
The present paper is closely related to a small number of other papers
that in the wake of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen’s (2002) results provided
potential explanations to the private equity premium puzzle. These include
Polkovnichenko (2002), Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina (2005) and Hintermaier
and Steinberger (2005). The latter contribution is the most closely related to
the present one since they both construct a model of entrepreneurial choice in
a life-cycle framework with idiosyncratic earnings and return shocks. Beyond
the surface though the two contributions differ radically in the way the occu-
pational choice is modeled. In fact the setup in Hinteremeier and Steinberger
(2005) is that of a limited participation model where entrepreneurship is simply
defined as holding of an asset — private equity — with a structure of partic-
ipation costs and returns that is different from the one of the risky financial
asset. On the contrary the present research models the choice between paid and
self-employment as a true occupational choice where both the return on human
capital and the return on financial capital are governed by different processes in
the two occupations. The two models also differ substantially in the informa-
tion structure since in the current model households face different conditional
distributions of project returns prior to entry and slowly learn project quality
via Bayesian learning, while in Hintermeier and Steinberger (2005) all house-
holds face the same distribution of project return and project quality is learned
perfectly after entry. As it will be seen in a later section these two differences
6
imply a radical difference in the way entry into entrepreneurship is obtained. It
also implies a more realistic set of characteristics for entrants. Polkovnichenko
(2002) uses a static model to assess the size of the premium that is needed to
induce the entrepreneurial choice when only a portion of human capital needs
to be invested in the business, a realistic assumption when the option to quit
is available. He finds that under these assumptions the premium is small so
that investment by entrepreneurs could be justified by minor non pecuniary
benefits. Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina (2005) construct a model where risky
entrepreneurial projects offer the possibility of eliminating non-concavities in
the agents’ continuation value and provide a valuable alternative to a safe asset
even with a negative excess return, especially for poor agents. The main con-
tribution of the present paper with respect to the ones mentioned above is that
it includes in a single model a dynamic life-cycle occupational choice between
paid and self-employment where this choice is fully specified in the sense that
it takes into account both the human and financial capital component of the
return jointly. While some of these elements are present in each of those studies,
they do not feature all of them in a single setup.
The present paper is also related, although more distantly to the large liter-
ature that has studied the choice to become entrepreneurs, both empirically and
theoretically but without reference to returns on private equity and the port-
folio choice of entrepreneurs. Among the empirical papers we find the works
of Evans and Jovanovic (1989) and Hurst and Lusardi (2004) who focus on
the impact of liquidity constraints on the decision to become entrepreneur and
Evans and Leighton (1989) and Hamilton (2000) that focus on earnings and
other demographic and economic characteristics of the potential entrant. In
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the quantitative literature there has been a recent wave of papers that have
studied the decision to become entrepreneur over the life-cycle with a focus on
liquidity constraints; examples are Buera (2006), Mondragon-Velez (2006) and
Akyol and Athreya (2007). Other models that study entrepreneurial choice in
a similar framework with uninsurable earnings risk and credit constraint are
Quadrini (2000), Cagetti and De Nardi (2006), Li (2002), Meh (2003) and Yaz
(2005). The first two of these papers are focused on studying the impact of
entrepreneurship on the concentration of wealth while the last three are more
focused on the impact that taxation has on the choice to become entrepreneur
and its public policy implications.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I describe the
model, in Section 3 the choice of parameters, in Section 4 the results and finally
in Section 5 I briefly make some conclusions and point to directions for future
research. An Appendix contains the description of the numerical methods used
to solve the model.
2 The Model
2.1 Demography and Preferences
Time is discrete and the model period is assumed to be 1 year. Given that time
does not enter as a separate state variable from age in the agent’s optimization
problem age is denoted with t without risk of confusion.2 Age in the model can
range from 1 to T = 65 years. Agents are assumed to enter the model at age
25 so that real life age is equal to t + 25. Each agent faces an age changing
2This is because the model is partial equilibrium and the exogenous price processes are
time independent.
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conditional probability of surviving to the next period which will be denoted
with pt. Surviving agents work the first S = 40 years and retire afterwards. All
agents start life with zero wealth.
Agents do not value leisure, hence they derive utility from the stream of
consumption they enjoy during their life-time only. Agents have Epstein-Zin
preferences so we can define their utility as
Vt =
{
cγ + βpt+1E(V αt+1)
γ
α
} 1
γ (1)
where 11−γ is the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, α determines the
agent’s aversion to risk and β is the subjective discount factor.
Agents are assumed to have a kid at the age of 35. No link between members
of the same dynasty is assumed, neither in the form of inheritance of parental
productivity nor in the form of an active bequest motive. However, unspent
wealth in case of early death is passed to the next member of the dynasty in
the form of financial assets. Given the timing of birth, the descendant inherits
when he is the age of the parent upon death minus 35 and for simplicity it is
assumed that he does not anticipate receiving the transfer. Given the focus of
the paper on the returns needed to entice households into entrepreneurship this
simplification is not relevant. This way of introducing bequests allows some
agents to have positive wealth very early in life, hence potentially to start a
business, without any extra complication in the computation.
2.2 Endowments and Assets
In each period before retirement agents are endowed with a certain amount of
units of labor. These units of labor are determined by two components. The first
component is deterministic and common to all agents. It is denoted with G(t)
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and is meant to reproduce the observed hump in life-cycle earnings. The second
component is stochastic and specific to the individual. In each period of life the
agent can choose between selling her endowment of labor for pay in the market
or being self-employed and run a privately held business. The implications of
this choice are twofold: first they imply subjecting the deterministic component
of the labor endowment to stochastic shocks governed by a different process,
second they imply a different set of assets in which the agent can invest. After
retirement all agents receive a constant social security benefit Y ss that is equal
for everybody. In the next two subsections I will describe the details of the two
occupations.
2.2.1 Paid Worker Earnings and Investment Choice
Agents who decide to work in the market face idiosyncratic shocks zt to their
endowment of labor units that follow a first order autoregressive process in
logarithms:
ln(zt) = ρ ln(zt−1) + εt (2)
where εt is an i.i.d shock from a normal distribution N(0, σ2ε) and is also inde-
pendent across agents and from all other return processes in the economy. With
this we can write the earnings of a paid employed agent as:
Y pet = G(t)zt. (3)
Agents that choose to be worker in any given period can invest in a single risky
financial asset that I call stock. The amount of stock that the household buys
in period t and holds up to period t+ 1 is denoted St+1 and is subject to a no
short sale constraint
St+1 ≥ 0. (4)
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The return on holding the stock from t to t+ 1 is denoted RSt+1.
2.2.2 Entrepreneur Earnings and Investment Choice
Entrepreneurs are defined by the fact that they are self-employed and use their
human capital to run a business in which they also invest part of their money.
Each business is characterized by a fixed parameter x that defines its quality by
affecting both the self-employed wage and the return on the financial resources
invested in the firm. 3 The human capital invested in the firm is also subject
to a shock ξt so that the wage earned by the agent as manager of her own firm
is defined by the equation:
Y set = λ1xG(t)exp(ξt). (5)
The shock ξt is assumed to be normalN(0, σ2ξ ), i.i.d. over time and perfectly cor-
related with the shock to the return on equity invested in the private firm. This
reflects the well documented fact that entrepreneurs typically manage the firm
in which they also invest their money so that returns on human and financial
capital are highly correlated for them. Finally the constant λ1 is a normaliza-
tion parameter that is equal for all agents and sets the average entrepreneurial
earnings in the economy. Entrepreneurs have a richer investment opportunity
set than workers since they can invest both in the stock described before and in
a second, non-tradable asset called private equity which represents the financial
investment in the firm they run and that I denote with Kt+1. It is assumed that
there is a minimum amount of financial resources that the entrepreneur needs
3In fact in the course of their lives agents may enter and exit self-employment several times
and so have a different x at different times; however I use x instead of xt, that is, I omit the
age index to stress the fact that this component of the project’s pay-off is fixed for a given
firm.
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to invest to start up and run a business so that the following inequalities hold:
Kt+1 ≥ K > 0. (6)
As it will become clear later, given that the entrepreneurial technology is as-
sumed to be additive in the agent’s endowment of labor and financial investment,
this positivity constraint is needed to have positive private equity investment
also among entrepreneurs facing a negative expected premium. This fits with
the empirical evidence that most private equity is held by individuals who are at
the same time the managers of the business. At the theoretical level extensive
literature starting with Jensen and Meckling (1976) demonstrates how asym-
metric information about managerial actions impose entrepreneurs to commit
personal funds to finance their project justifying the assumption made here.
The pay-off from the financial investment in the business is given by
Ωt+1 = λ2exp(qt+1)f(Kt+1). (7)
Here f(Kt+1) is an increasing and concave function of the amount invested in
private equity and λ2 is again a normalization constant that is equal for all
entrepreneurs. The remaining term qt+1 is given by the following equation:
qt+1 = x+ ut+1 (8)
where x denotes the fixed project quality and ut+1 is a normal random variable
U ∼ N(0, σ2U ) and is i.i.d. over time and independent across firms. Also as
it was said before ut is perfectly positively correlated with ξt the shock to the
entrepreneur’s units of labor. The assumption of decreasing returns to scale
in the function describing the pay-off generated by private equity investment
is common in models featuring heterogeneous firms like Cagetti and De Nardi
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(2006) and Cooley and Quadrini (2001) and can be justified for example by
the existence of a fixed factor in production like the managerial talent of the
entrepreneur. As the firm grows and the entrepreneur’s managerial skills are
spread over a larger activity, a marginal increase in investment generates less
and less extra income.4 As it will be seen in the calibration section, at a practical
level, the assumption of decreasing returns on the investment in private firms
helps slowing the growth of even the firms of the best quality. This in turn is
useful to generate an average firms size that is in line with the data. 5
2.3 The Occupational Choice and Learning
The variable x that determines the quality of an entrepreneurial project, defined
by its return on human and financial capital invested in it, cannot be directly
observed. In each period when an agent is a paid employee she draws a value
of x from a distribution X ∼ N(0, σ2X). The agent also draws a realization of
the random variable U . The agent cannot observe x directly; what she observes
instead is a noisy signal of it, that is, the sum x+u. Based on this signal and on
her prior over the distribution of x which is assumed to coincide with the true
distribution X, she forms a first estimate of the quality of the project she drew
using Bayes’ rule. Based on this estimate she decides whether to start running
the business and become an entrepreneur or to stay in her current occupation,
4The idea of the dimension of the firm being determined by the optimal allocation of
managerial talent over resources, or “span of control ”, was introduced in Lucas (1978).
5An alternative or possibly complementary way to obtain the same result would be to add
an AR(1) shock in equation (7) since this would allow even the best projects to turn bad for
some periods. Although this way has its own merits it would imply the addition of a further
state variable to a problem that has already two continuous state variables plus three discrete
ones. For this reason it was chosen not to pursue this idea.
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that is, paid employment. If she decides to become an entrepreneur, in the
following period she keeps the same initial draw of project quality x, observes
a new noisy signal x + u and based on this, updates her beliefs. Based on the
updated beliefs the occupational choice is repeated in the same fashion until the
agent decides to switch occupation. On the other hand if she decides to stay
in paid employment, in the following period she receives a new draw of project
quality from the distribution X and a new noise u and repeats the same choice
again. Successive draws from X are independent over time.6 Finally, when an
agent decides to switch from self-employment to paid employment she draws
the initial labor earnings shock in the new occupation from some distribution
Zs that is independent of her past occupational history.
In practice then, what an entrepreneur uses to update her beliefs is the se-
quence of observations qt = x+ ut independently drawn from a normal random
variable N(x, σ2U ) with mean equal to the true value of the parameter that de-
scribes the average pay-off to the project. Based on this sequence and the initial
prior the agent uses Bayesian updating to form a sequence of posteriors which
are themselves normal random variables. The sequential learning problem de-
fined above can be handled by the Kalman filter technique. For the purpose
of describing the agent’s optimization problem it is sufficient to introduce a
6This assumption implies that the experience acquired by running a firm is entirely lost
when the business is closed. One consequence is that the model cannot capture the fact that
the probability of entry is higher for former business owners than for the general population as
reported in Quadrini (2000). An alternative assumption would be that the draw of the project
quality is taken from a better distribution if an agent had previously run a business. This
assumption would give an extra benefit to the choice of becoming an entrepreneur and induce
agents to accept even lower returns to make this choice. This possibility would strengthen the
conclusions reached in this paper but is not pursued here since it would further complicate
the solution of the model.
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variable xˆt for the mean of the posterior distribution of the fixed project qual-
ity parameter. It could be shown that this variable evolves according to the
following law of motion:
xˆt+1,a+1 = (1− Λa+1)xˆt,a + Λa+1qt+1 (9)
where xˆt,a is the mean of the posterior distribution of an age t agent that has
observed a signals about the same project. Given the description above this
means that this agent run the business for a − 1 periods. The law of motion
weights the mean of the current posterior and the new noisy observation to get
the mean of the new posterior. The weight Λa+1 can be computed using the
following recursion:
Λa+1 =
Σa+1
Σa+1 + σ2U
(10)
Σa+1 =
Σaσ2U
Σa + σ2U
(11)
The recursion starts with xˆt,0 = 0 and Σ0 = σ2X , that is, the mean and variance
of the distribution of X which is taken to be the initial prior. The distribution
of xˆt+1 is then N(xˆt,Λa+1Σa+1). 7
2.4 The Households’ Dynamic Programming Problem
With the description of the model given above I can now write the recursive
formulation of the household’s utility maximization problem during working
age. At each age t before retirement the agent’s state variables can be described
by the 4-dimensional vector (dt, zt, xˆt, a) where dt denotes currently available
resources, zt is the current labor earnings shock, xˆt is the mean of the posterior
7See Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000) for an introductory treatment or Harvey (1989) for a
more complete and formal one.
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distribution of the project quality parameter and a is the number of noisy signals
observed on a project as of age t. As we saw in the last section these last two
parameters are needed to form the new posterior that enters the computation
of continuation utility. At the beginning of the period and given the states the
agent compares the utility of becoming a paid worker with that of choosing
entrepreneurship.
The optimal indirect utility of choosing to become a worker in the period
for an agent whose state is described by the vector (dt, zt, xˆt, a), is:
V pet (dt, zt, 0, 0) = max
ct,St+1
{
cγt + βpt+1Et
[
Vt+1(dt+1, zt+1, xˆt+1, 1)α
] γ
α
} 1
γ
(12)
subject to the following constraints
ct + St+1 ≤ dt (13)
dt+1 = RSt+1St+1 + Y
pe
t+1 (14)
xˆt+1 = (1− Λ1) · 0 + Λ1qt+1 (15)
and the no short sale constraint given by equation (4). Notice that since agents
receive a first signal about a new project while they are still working for pay
the variable a is set to 1 in the right hand side of the Bellman equation; for the
same reason in the law of motion for xˆt+1 I have the subindex on the weight
Λ taking the value one. Also the second and third argument of V pet , that is,
xˆt and a, are set to 0: this is because when an agent decides to be a worker in
the following period, even if he is currently an entrepreneur, his past experience
at running a project gets lost.8 Finally expressions (13) and (14) represent a
8Once this point is clear, the more general notation could be used but I preferred to
substitute the numerical value of xˆt and a at the beginning of the recursion on the beliefs
about the project quality for the sake of clarity.
16
standard budget constraint and the law of motion of the resources available to
an agent that chooses to be a paid worker.
The utility of becoming an entrepreneur is defined by the following equations:
V set (dt, zt, xˆt, a) = max
ct,St+1,Kt+1
{
cγt+βpt+1Et
[
Vt+1(dt+1, z0, xˆt+1, a+1)α
] γ
α
} 1
γ
(16)
subject to the following constraints:
ct + St+1 +Kt+1 ≤ dt (17)
dt+1 = RSt+1St+1 +Ωt+1 + Y
se
t+1 (18)
the law of motion of xˆt+1 given by equation (9) and the constraints (6) and
(4). Some comments are needed to clarify the problem stated above. First
notice that in the second argument of the value function on the right hand
side of the Bellman equation the notation z0 appears instead of zt+1. This is
because if an agent chooses to be an entrepreneur in a given period, then when
she makes the decision again next period the efficiency units of labor on the
market that she will face are not determined by the AR(1) process described
by equation (2), they are drawn instead from the distribution Zs. The notation
z0 is then a convention to distinguish this case. Second the last state variable
in the value function on the right hand side takes the value of a+ 1 because if
an agent chooses to be an entrepreneur in the current period then she adds one
more noisy observation on the project quality parameter. Following the Bellman
equation the first inequality is a standard budget constraint. The second one
is the law of motion of the agent’s resources: these are the sum of the realized
return on the stock investment and on the investment in private equity plus
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the earnings the agent receives as manager of the firm she owns and manages.
These earnings are given by equation (5) substituting xˆ for x.
Finally the optimal value function of a working age agent aged t is obtained
as the result of the optimal occupational choice, that is:
Vt(dt, zt, xˆt, a) = max
{
V pet (dt, zt, 0, 0), V
se
t (dt, zt, xˆt, a)
}
(19)
The recursive formulation of the optimization problem during retirement
boils down to the following set of equations:
Vt(dt) = max
ct,St+1
{
cγt + βpt+1Et[Vt+1(dt+1)
α]
γ
α
} 1
γ
(20)
subject to the budget constraint
ct + St+1 ≤ dt (21)
the law of motion of financial resources
dt+1 = RSt+1St+1 + Y
ss (22)
where Y ss is the pension benefit and the no short sale constraint. The problem
reflects the fact that upon reaching age 65 all agents in the model are forced to
retire and that private equity cannot be held by a non entrepreneur so that the
financial asset is the only asset available to the household.
The model is analytically untractable and therefore it is solved by numerical
methods. The description of the numerical solution is left to the Appendix.
3 Parameter Calibration
In this section I describe the choice of parameters. As it is standard in the
literature some parameters are chosen based on other studies while the remain-
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ing ones are fixed with the goal of matching some features of the dynamics of
self-employment.
3.1 Preference and Demographic Parameters
Preferences are described by three parameters. First the subjective discount
factor β is fixed at 0.96 a value consistent with most macroeconomic studies.
Second the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution γ is set at 0.5. Finally the
values of the risk aversion coefficient α will change across experiments and will
be described in the corresponding result sections.
Survival probabilities are obtained using mortality tables for the US male
population and are taken from “The Berkeley Mortality Database”. 9
3.2 Business Quality
As we saw in the model section it is assumed that there is a population of
entrepreneurial ideas characterized by a parameter x. Also, the true value of x
is not observable because of a random noise u. There is no reference in the data
about the value of these two abstractly defined random variables so, to pick
their variances, I proceed in the following way. First I set the value of σ2U . In
the baseline case this value is picked so that the standard deviation of the shock
to individual firm private equity return is 32 percent or double the standard
deviation of the return on public equity. This is meant to capture the idea that
even for a well established firm whose parameter x is estimated precisely the
investment in its equity is still substantially riskier than the investment in a
diversified stock index. Secondly the value of σ2X is chosen to obtain a wide
9The database is available at the web site http://www.demog.berkely.edu.
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Figure 1: Cross section of private firm returns: Baseline calibration.
distribution in the cross section of firm returns, given the standard deviation of
the shock u. The resulting distribution of cross-sectional firm returns for the
baseline case is depicted in Figure 1.
This distribution reproduces the main features of the one reported in Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), in particular the wide range of returns, extend-
ing from - 80 percent to more than a 100 percent, the fatter right tail of the
distribution and the modal values centered slightly to the left of a 0 percent net
return.10 In the sensitivity analysis an alternative case is considered where the
ratio between σ2U and σ
2
X is kept constant and the standard deviation of U is
reduced to 20 percent.
3.3 Earnings
Earnings, both for the paid employed and for the self employed incorporate a
deterministic component G(t) that is a function of age and is equal for all agents.
This component is represented by a third order polynomial with the parameters
taken from the estimates by Cocco, Gomes and Maenhout (2005). For the paid
10See Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), Figure 2 on page 770.
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employed this deterministic component is hit by AR(1) shocks in logarithms
with the autocorrelation coefficient ρ equal to 0.95 and the standard deviation
of the innovation εt equal to 0.158. Both values are close to the ones normally
found in the macroeconomic literature.11 In the case of the self-employed we
need to fix two more parameters: the variance of the i.i.d shock ξt and the
normalization constant λ1. The value of σξ is set at 0.54 to reflect the well doc-
ument fact that entrepreneurs face substantially more volatility in their earnings
than workers. 12 It is also assumed that this shock is perfectly correlated with
the shock to the return on private equity ut to reflect the fact that entrepreneurs
manage the firm in which they invest their money. The constant λ1 determines
the average level of earnings for the population of self-employed agents. To
understand how this parameter is chosen, observe that in any period when an
agent is a worker a key factor in the decision to enter into entrepreneurship
is the comparison between the expected earnings in the two occupations. By
looking at equation (5) we can see that λ1 will determine the threshold values of
the estimated x that prompt entry into self-employment for any given value of
the current shock zt to the earnings the agent obtains in paid-employment. We
can then fix its values so that given all the other parameters we match the entry
rate into self-employment of 2.4 percent reported in Evans and Leighton (1989).
The description of the earnings processes in the economy is completed by the
distribution Zs that an agent faces when she switches occupation from self to
paid-employment. For simplicity this is assumed to be a 3 point distribution.
11See, to mention two examples, Hubbard, Skinner and Zeldes (1994) and Huggett and
Ventura (2000).
12This fact together with some estimates is reported for example in Heaton and Lucas (2000)
or Rosen and Willen (2002).
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This distribution is important in determining both entry and exit rates, thus
also the average share of entrepreneurs, because it determines endogenously the
value of the alternative option for an agent that is currently an entrepreneur,
that is, going back to paid employment. For simplicity I pick the realizations
of Zs on the same grid used for the distribution of z and fix the probabilities
of being in each state so that the model is able to match the average share
of the population that are entrepreneurs, given the entry rate. The resulting
distribution features an expectation that is below the expected earnings for a
continuing worker with the lowest earnings realization. This implies that in the
model there is an opportunity cost of leaving work in the form of missing labor
experience on top of the wage lost.
Finally I set the social security benefit Y ss at approximately 40 percent of
average earnings in the economy, a value that is used for example by De Nardi
(2004).
3.4 Assets
As it was said in the model description section there are two assets in the
economy. The financial asset is thought to have a mean return of 7 percent and
a standard deviation of 16 percent in line with the historical first two moments
of the return on the US stock market as reported for example in Mehra and
Prescott (1985).
The second asset is private equity whose pay-off is defined by equation (7):
the parameters defining the distributions of X and U were described before in
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subsection 3.2. The function f(K) is taken to be of the following form:
f(K) =
 K if K ≤ K∗(K − K˜)ν + b if K > K∗
that is, the function is concave with a linear stretch close to the origin and a
strictly concave one to the right of the threshold value K∗. Both this value
and K˜ depend uniquely on b and ν and are determined so that the function f is
continuous and with continuous first derivative. The parameters to calibrate are
then ν which determines the strength of decreasing returns to scale in private
equity investment and b which determines the amount of private equity where
decreasing returns kick in. The first of the two parameters is chosen based
on external studies. Basu and Fernald (1997) estimate returns to scale at the
industry level and find values that are slightly below 1 both for the overall
economy and for manufacturing only. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) based on
the study mentioned above use a value of 0.975, while Cagetti and De Nardi
(2006) find a value of 0.88 from calibrating a macroeconomic model with private
entrepreneurs. Based on these studies I set ν to 0.94. Once that parameter is
set the value of b is chosen so that in the baseline calibration the model can
approximately match the ratio of average private firm equity to the average
earnings of working age households. The values for these two variables are taken
from Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) and from Budr´ıa-Rodr´ıguez et al.
(2002) respectively.13
The parameter λ2 is a normalization constant which is crucial in the experi-
ments performed on the model. It is fixed so that the average un-weighted share
13Since the value of ν is not pinpointed exactly in the data, I also experimented with values
close to 0.94 and readjusting b accordingly. Results, which are not reported to economize
space, are not different from the ones presented here in an important way.
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of wealth invested by entrepreneurial households in private equity matches the
one in the data. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) and De Nardi et al.
(2007) report values of this variable. As a target I choose the one in De Nardi
et al. (2007) which refers to the ratio of business assets to wealth and as such is
closer to the definition in our models that features no liabilities by assumption.
Averaging across several issues of the Survey of Consumer Finances they report
a value of about 33 percent.
Finally, investment in private equity in the model is subject to a minimum
requirement K. Hurst and Lusardi (2004) report figures about equity size of
firms: for example in the 1987 National Survey of Small Business Finances the
median amount of capital needed to found a business was $32500 and about
25 percent founded a firm with less than $7500 (in 1998 dollars). In the 1989
Panel Study of Income Dynamics about 38 percent of entrepreneurs had less
than $6500 in business equity, and among those who become entrepreneurs in
the interval 1989 to 1994 over 75 percent had less than $27500 in business equity
at the end of the period. Overall this suggests that the amount of equity needed
to run a business is small. Based on those figures I set the baseline value of K to
be equivalent to 50 percent of average annual wages or about $20000 based on
the figures for average earnings in Budr´ıa Rodr´ıguez et al. (2002). A sensitivity
analysis on this parameter is performed as well.
4 Results
In the present section I report the results of the quantitative experiments. The
presentation is organized in three subsections: the first one is devoted to an
extensive analysis of a baseline case, the second one considers the consequences
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of removing learning from the model and the third one is dedicated to a set
of sensitivity analysis. The focus of the analysis is on the decision to become
entrepreneur investing a large share of personal assets in the business and the
premium that private equity needs to pay above public equity to obtain that
allocation. Also a number of statistics about the dynamics of entry and exit
in and out of self-employment over the life-cycle are reported to lend support
to the model. To address the main question of the paper the following exper-
iment is performed. The value of the constant λ2 is chosen so that the target
average allocation to private equity is matched. The resulting value of the av-
erage excess return on private equity above the financial asset is taken as the
measure of the private equity premium needed to rationalize entrepreneurial
choice. The question is then similar to the one in Heaton and Lucas (2002)
and Polkovnichenko (2003) who, for a given excess risk generated by the id-
iosyncratic nature of private equity, look at the premium that must be paid
to induce agents to make that investment. The difference lies in the fact that
here the size of the investment is not fixed but can be adjusted subject to a
minimum equity requirement, so that I look at the excess return on private
equity that generates the empirically observed cross-section of private capital in
the portfolio of entrepreneurs. I report two different measures of the return on
private equity. In order to define them I first need to define the yearly return
to an individual firm. This is given by the ratio of the value of capital invested
in the business at the end of the period — including both capital appreciation
and the dividend — and the initial investment itself, that is, using the notation
described in the model section:
RKi,t =
Ωi,t
Ki,t
. (23)
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With the definition of firm’s i return at hand we can define two different mea-
sures of aggregate returns. Omitting for notational simplicity the time index,
the first one is a simple equally weighted average return:
RPEun−weighted =
∑
RKi
nent
(24)
where nent is the number of entrepreneurs. The second one is a value weighted
average return or equivalently the return on the index of private equity, RPEindex
and is defined as the average of individual ex-post realized firm returns — the
RKs — weighted by the firms’ share in total private equity, that is:
RPEindex =
∑{
RKi
Ki∑
Ki
}
. (25)
This latter measure is the model counterpart to the index return constructed
by Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002), while the former is more relevant
when studying the individual decision to become entrepreneur.
4.1 Baseline Model
In this experiment I take the coefficient α which determines agents’ risk aversion
to be 2 for one half of the population and 5 for the remaining half. The choice
to have two types of agents, one with low risk aversion and the other with high
risk aversion follows Gomes and Michaelides (2005). The two authors show that
this choice is able to rationalize both the average stock market participation rate
and the average stock share for participants in a standard portfolio choice model
with reasonably low participation costs. This choice is meant to insure that the
model here would be consistent with the allocation between stock and bonds
if the latter asset was added to the model. The results are organized in two
subsections: the first one is focused on the main subject of the paper, that
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Table 1: Entrepreneurial portfolio and returns
Std. of returns 36.4 %
Public equity return 7.0
Private equity return (equally-weighted) 8.3
Private equity return (value-weighted) 24.1
Portfolio share of private equity: (equally-weighted) 32.5
Portfolio share of private equity: (value-weighted) 45.6
is, the predictions of the quantitative model regarding private equity returns.
In the second subsection the patterns of entry and exit in and out of self-
employment generated by the model are described. While not central to the
main result, this latter section supports the present model and calibration as a
reasonable description of entrepreneurial choice over the life-cycle and therefore
its predictions about the private equity return.
4.1.1 Entrepreneurial Portfolio and Returns
In this section the focus is on the portfolio allocation of the self-employed and
the premium that private equity needs to pay to obtain that allocation. Results
are reported in Table 1. In the top line we see that the standard deviation
of the shock to returns, which determines the risk of entrepreneurial firms is
approximately 36 percent, that is, twice the historical volatility of the Standard
and Poor 500 index. In the fifth line we see that the average entrepreneur
holds about 33 percent of his wealth in a business as does the average American
entrepreneur: this is no surprise since this was a calibration target. We can see
from the last line of the table that, when the share of wealth invested in private
equity is weighted by firm size, the average is 45.6 percent. The fact that value
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weighted allocations to private equity are higher than simple averages conforms
with the empirical evidence in Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002). The
second line reports the return on the stock investment which was set exogenously
at 7 percent. The third and fourth lines report the two measures of the return on
equity in private business. The first one is the equally-weighted average. As we
can see this average is only 8.3 percent, slightly more than one percentage point
above the return on the public stock. The second measure is the value weighted
average computed according to equation (25). This measure is the return on
the index of private equity. What we see is that this return is 24.1 percent
or approximately 17 percentage points above the return on the stock. This
number is 7 percentage points higher than the 10 percent figure that Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) report as a back-of-the-envelope calculation —
based on a number of previous studies — of the premium needed to induce
an agent to take the idiosyncratic risk of a single entrepreneurial project. In
what follows we will explore better the working of the model to interpret these
findings.
First we want to explore the difference between the two measures of returns.
This is done by way of Figure 2 which reports the average return of existing firms
as a function of age. For comparison the figure also reports the return on the
stock represented by the flat dotted line. As we can see the lines representing the
two measures of private equity returns are both increasing. This reflects learning
and selection of poor quality firms out of the market. Recall here that agents
make the decision to become entrepreneur based on a noisy signal of project
quality: while some of the entrants do run good firms many of them enter “by
mistake ”. With time the latter businesses will close down, hence the average
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Figure 2: Average returns by age of the firms. Data are plotted yearly
for firms less than five years old and by 5 years groups for older firms.
quality of firms and the average return improve with the age of the cohort of
firms. Although qualitatively similar, the two curves differ quantitatively. They
start relatively close to each other and more than 7 percentage points below
the return on public equity; afterwards, the curve of value-weighted returns
climbs up much faster reaching a level of about 30 percent while the one of
equally-weighted returns never exceeds the public equity return by more than 8
percentage points. This result follows from the fact that firms of better quality,
hence with higher average return on their equity, experience a faster rate of
growth. This explains the finding that the return on the aggregate index of
private equity is so high: the index is overwhelmingly made by the equity of the
high return, fast growing firms.
Second as one may infer from the two curves many firms — especially re-
cently created ones — do face an expected return that is below the public equity
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index, yet households are willing to undertake the investment. 14 I explore this
issue with the help of Table 2. In the model the choice to become entrepreneur
offers two additional benefits that are not measured in the return on the in-
vestment in private equity. First, an agent can receive a bad labor earnings
shock while in paid employment. Because of persistence this translates into
worse expectations about future paid-employment earnings. Switching to self-
employment then, may give a direct benefit in terms of improved return on
human capital. A look at the upper panel of Table 2 confirms this fact: the
probability of switching into self-employment is 8.9 percent for agents with the
lowest earnings shock, 0.2 percent for those with the intermediate shock and
virtually 0 for those with the highest labor shock. The idea that entry into
self-employment is more likely among households with negative performance in
the labor market is consistent with the findings of Evans and Leighton (1989).
Second entering entrepreneurs face substantial uncertainty about the average
pay-off to their firm. If this turns out to be high they may end up earning a
substantial premium on their investment. In the opposite case they can quickly
switch back to paid employment. The possibility of exit reduces the losses in
case the business project proves to be bad. To the extent that the potential
benefit in case of success outweighs the cost in case of failure and exit, the
option of undertaking entrepreneurship is valuable and the household will be
willing to make the initial investment in private equity even if in the first few
years it pays a negative premium on public equity in expectation. 15 This can
14To see why, observe that individual firm’s returns are hit by shocks with mean one. If all
firms had the same x the average return marked on the continuous curve would coincide with
the expected return of all firms. With heterogeneous xs the expected return on their private
equity will be above the curve for some firms and below it for others.
15The idea that there is an option value of learning, that is, that an agent may want to
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Table 2: An analysis of entry
Frequency of entry by earnings shock
Low shock Intermediate shock High shock
8.9% 0.2% 0.0%
Percentage of entrants with expected income loss
20.5 62.7 18.1
be seen in the bottom panel of Table 2 that reports the percentage of entrants
that expect a net loss from choosing to become entrepreneurs in the period this
choice is made. This quantity can be easily computed using the simulated data
which include the variables z and xˆ. With these values it is possible to compute
the difference in expected earnings in the two occupations plus the difference in
expected return on the two investments (the stock and private equity) multi-
plied by the optimal private equity choice if entrepreneurship is selected. This
quantity forms the expected net income gain/loss from entrepreneurship upon
making the entry decision. As it can be seen in Table 2, 20.5 percent of those
who decide to become entrepreneur when they face the lowest labor earnings
shock and 62.7 percent of those with the intermediate shock expect a net income
loss at the time the decision is made. This confirms the fact that the mechanism
described above and induced by learning can be a quantitatively relevant factor
in determining the choice to become entrepreneur.
Summarizing, with respect to the two issues raised by the empirical findings
of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) we can say that the present model
provides an explanation for the fact that households may decide to become
run a project with negative NPV while he waits for new information about a possible higher
return in the future is also discussed in a theoretical paper by Miao and Wang (2007).
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entrepreneurs even in the face of a negative expected premium of private equity
compared to public equity. On the other hand, with respect to the index return
the estimate of the premium over public equity provided by the model is in the
range of 15 percentage points, thus confirming the puzzling features of the data.
4.1.2 Entrepreneurial Dynamics
In this section I turn to the implications of the model for entrepreneurial dy-
namics. Results are reported in Table 3. In the first row we see that the entry
rate is 2.4 percent in the model, matching exactly the value that can be found
in Evans and Leighton’s (1989) study about self-employment. The fifth line
reports the average fraction of the population that is an entrepreneur at a point
in time. This figure is 11.0 percent in the data according to Moskowitz and
Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) and is 10.7 percent in the model. The two statistics
reported above were calibration target so not surprisingly they are matched
quite well by the model. To check the ability of the model to reproduce the
dynamics of entrepreneurial choice I report four more statistics. In the second
and third row we can see the survival rate at 5 and 10 years. The survival rate
at five years is 38.5 percent in the data and it is a very close 38.9 percent in the
model. At a ten year horizon the difference between model and data is slightly
larger with the survival rates being respectively 23.6 and 29.5 percent. The
exit rate is 14.0 percent in the model and is 21.6 percent in the data, according
to what reported in Evans and Leighton (1989) based on the Current Popula-
tion Survey. Finally the average firm age is 10.3 years in the data reported by
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) and it is 9.4 years in the model. The
last four statistics reported above were not calibration targets. The fact that
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Table 3: Entrepreneurial dynamics
Data Model
Average entry rate 2.4 2.4
Survival rate (5 years) 38.5 38.9
Survival rate (10 years) 23.6 29.5
Exit rate 21.6 14.0
Fraction of entrepreneurs 11.0 10.7
Average firm age 10.3 9.4
they are close to their empirical counterparts then suggests that the learning
model adopted here represents a reasonable approximation to the dynamics of
the self-employment decision in the US data.
4.2 More on the role of learning and the minimum equity
requirement
In this subsection I further explore the role of learning by solving a version of the
model that starting from the baseline choice of parameters simply assumes that
project quality is already known at the time the decision to become entrepreneur
is made. Secondly I explore the effects of changing the size of the minimum
equity requirement in the baseline model with learning. Results are reported in
Tables 4, 5 and 6.
As we can see from the first line of Table 6 eliminating learning leads to an
increase in the entry rate from 2.4 to 3.3 percent. While at first sight this may
seem to contradict the fact that learning is an important mechanism explain-
ing the choice to become entrepreneur, a more careful analysis of the results
will show that this is not the case. First, the reason why the entry rate jumps
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up is that the distribution of expected project quality, that in the model with-
out learning coincides with the distribution of true project quality is more dis-
persed.16 For any given threshold level of estimated project quality that triggers
entry this would generate a higher entry rate. In the model without learning,
though entry can occur only if the true quality of the project is good. This
is reflected in the statistics reported in Table 4. We can see that the equally
weighted return on private equity jumps up from 8.3 percent to 18.9 percent
and the equally weighted share invested in business assets by entrepreneurs in-
creases from 32.5 to 53.8 percent. Another notable result reported in the table
is that the difference between the equally and value weighted return on private
equity is substantially smaller than in the model with learning: it is 5 percent-
age points in the model without learning (the two returns are 18.9 and 23.9
percent respectively) while it is 16 percentage points in the model with learning
(the two returns are in this case 8.3 and 24.1 percent). This difference reflects
the fact that in the model without learning the only source of heterogeneity in
individual firms’ return is related to true differences while in the model with
learning there is an added source related to the initial uncertainty about project
quality. This acts towards reducing the equally weighted return by determining
the entry of many firms of poor quality which are later selected out. Summariz-
ing, while there is more entry in the model without learning, this is determined
by returns on private equity that are higher and exceeding those on the stock
since the early years of a firm’s life.
This is confirmed by Table 5. The lower panel of the table reports the
fraction of entrants that expect a net income loss upon making the decision
16This result can be proved analytically, see Harvey (1989).
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Table 4: Entrepreneurial portfolio and returns
Baseline No learning Low K
Std. of returns 36.4 % 36.1 % 35.9 %
Public equity return 7.0 7.0 7.0
Private equity return (e-w) 8.3 18.9 7.0
Private equity return (v-w) 24.1 23.9 26.2
Share of private equity: (e-w) 32.5 53.8 29.9
Share of private equity: (v-w) 45.6 47.7 46.1
Note: e-w stands for equally weighted, v-w stands for value weighted.
to become entrepreneurs in the model without learning. What we can see is
that among agents with the lowest labor earnings shock only 1.8 percent decide
to enter expecting a net loss — compared to the alternative occupation — in
the first year of business and among agents with the median earnings shock
the figure is 3.5 percent, down from 20.5 and 62.7 percent in the model with
learning. 17 Overall this result confirms the intuition that learning plays an
important role in determining entry: once it is removed from the model the
choice of becoming entrepreneur with the expectation of an immediate income
loss over paid-employment becomes a very unfrequent outcome.
The fact that there is a non negligible fraction of agents with the highest
earnings shock that are willing to become entrepreneurs even if they expect an
immediate income loss in less easy to interpret. One possibility is that since
these agents are likely to also have substantial financial wealth, they can reap
the diversification benefits from having access to a second asset. This points to
17The comparison of this figure for agents with the highest labor earnings shock is not
meaningful because in the model with learning there are so few entrants that the figure
reported in Table 2 in this case is statistically unreliable.
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Table 5: An analysis of entry
Frequency of entry by earnings shock: No learning
Low shock Intermediate shock High shock
6.4% 2.7% 1.9%
Percentage of entrants with expected income loss
1.8 3.5 28.3
Frequency of entry by earnings shock: low K
Low shock Intermediate shock High shock
12.9% 0.2% 0.0%
Percentage of entrants with expected income loss
14.9 58.6 50.0
a complementary explanation to the choice of becoming entrepreneur that I do
not further explore here because it is outside the scope of the paper. Finally the
model without learning produces very counterfactual results in terms of firm
dynamics: as it can be seen in Table 6, the survival rates are 95 percent or
more at both horizons, the exit rate is only 3.8 percent and the average fraction
of entrepreneurs is 32.9 percent, all figures that are very far from their data
counterparts.
Next I examine the effects of changing the minimum equity requirement.
This is done because the size of equity in reality is endogenous while in the
model this requirement makes the amount of equity exogenous for those firms
with an expected return below the stock. Analyzing the effects of a change in
the value chosen for this parameters is meant to insure that the main results of
the model are robust with respect to this choice. I consider a calibration that
is like the baseline model except that K is reduced to half its original value or
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Table 6: Entrepreneurial dynamics
Baseline No learning low K
Average entry rate 2.4 3.3 3.3
Survival rate (5 years) 38.9 98.0 40.6
Survival rate (10 years) 29.5 94.6 31.5
Exit rate 14.0 3.8 12.9
Fraction of entrepreneurs 10.7 32.9 15.0
Average firm age 9.4 13.9 10.3
equivalently from 20000 to 10000 dollars. Intuitively, everything else equal, this
reduces the initial opportunity cost of becoming entrepreneur and should draw
in the occupation agents with projects offering lower returns. This intuition is
supported by the results. As we can see in the third column of Table 6 the
entry rate goes up to 3.3 percent, while the survival rates at 5 and 10 years
slightly go up to 40.6 percent and 31.5 percent. Looking at Table 4 one can
see that the equally weighted return on private equity is slightly reduced to
7.0 percent (down from 8.3 percent in the baseline case) and that a conditional
share in private equity of 29.9 percent is supported by that premium. The value
weighted return is 26.2 percent corresponding to a premium of about 19 percent
over the public equity index. A look at Table 5 shows that 12.9 percent of agents
with the lowest earnings shock decide to enter, while this percentage drops to
0.2 percent among agents with the intermediate shock and to virtually zero for
agents with the highest shock. The percentage of entrants that expect a net
income loss from the choice to become an entrepreneur is 14.9 percent among
those with the lowest paid employment earnings shock and 58.6 percent among
those with the median shock. Overall all the results obtained when K is reduced
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are very similar to the baseline case confirming that the particular choice of the
value of the minimum equity requirement is not driving the results.
4.3 Sensitivity Analysis
In the present section I describe the results of two sensitivity analysis conducted
respectively on the risk aversion parameter of the agents and on the risk entailed
by private equity. The experiments involved in these two sensitivity analysis con-
sist of changing the parameter under study and then readjusting the constants
λ1 and λ2 so that the model still matches the entry rate into entrepreneurship
and the average equally weighted share invested in private equity conditional on
an agent being an entrepreneur. In this way we can still interpret the return on
private equity produced by the model as the one needed to explain the decision
to become self-employmed and the associated investment choice observed in the
data.
The results of the first sensitivity analysis are reported in Table 7. In the first
two lines the model standard deviation of individual firms’ equity returns and
the return on the stock are reported. These are respectively about 35 percent
and 7 percent reflecting the fact that they match their calibration target. For
the same reason in the fifth line the value of the equally weighted conditional
share invested in private equity is about 32 percent in all the three risk aversion
cases. The main result of the sensitivity analysis is expressed in the third line.
In the second column we can see that the average equally weighted return on
private equity when all agents have a risk aversion coefficient of 2 is 2.9 percent;
this corresponds to 4 percentage points less than the return on the stock so
in this case we find that the entrepreneurial choice can be justified even with
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Figure 3: Return by age of the firm: Low risk aversion (Left panel), high
risk aversion (right panel). Baseline risk of private equity. Data are plotted
yearly for firms less than five years old and by 5 years groups for older firms.
a negative private equity premium for the average entrepreneur. When risk
aversion is raised to 5 instead, the equally weighted average return to private
equity reaches a value of 11.3 percent, thus exceeding the one on the stock by
4.3 percentage points. Although this is a sizeable excess return, still it does not
invalidate the main result about entrepreneurial choice. This can be seen by
looking at the right panel of Figure 4.3. The figure reports average returns —
equally and value-weighted — on private equity by age of the firm. The right
panel shows that even in the case where all agents have a risk aversion of 5,
the average returns on firms aged 3 or fewer years is still below the one on the
diversified stock. This implies that for the “typical entrant”the expected return
on the financial investment is below the one on public equity. The fourth and
last line of the table report the value weighted private equity return and average
allocation to business asset respectively. As we can see the return on the index
of private equity goes down to 22.8 percent when risk aversion is 2 for all agents
and goes up to 27.4 when it is 5. These numbers imply an excess return above
the stock of about 15 and 20 percentage points. The associated conditional
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Table 7: Entrepreneurial portfolio and returns: Changing risk aversion.
Baseline RA=2 RA=5
Std. of returns 36.4 % 35.0 % 37.4 %
Public equity return 7.0 7.0 7.0
Private equity return (equally-weighted) 8.3 2.9 11.3
Private equity return (value-weighted) 24.1 22.8 27.4
Share of private equity: (equally-weighted) 32.5 32.4 31.8
Share of private equity: (value-weighted) 45.6 51.1 38.7
weighted allocation to private equity are 51.1 percent when risk aversion is 2
and 38.7 percent when risk aversion is 5.
Table 8 reports the results of the other sensitivity analysis, the one on the
risk of holding private equity. In particular here we assume a lower value of
the standard deviation of the returns on private equity. This is reflected in the
first line of the table where we can read a standard deviation of firms’ returns of
about 24 percent. As usual in the fifth line the equally weighted share of private
equity in entrepreneurial portfolio is showed and once again the value is at its
32 percent calibration target. The equally weighted average return on private
equity is 4 percent when half of the agents have risk aversion of 2 and half have
risk aversion of 5, it is 1.4 percent when all agents have risk aversion of 2 and it
is 6.9 percent when they all have risk aversion 5. This implies that a negative
average premium of private over public equity is consistent with the pattern
of entry and un-diversified investment in business assets observed in the data.
Clearly, as it was pointed out before, this also means that for a large number
of entrepreneurs entry and duration in the occupation do occur in the face of a
negative expected premium of business assets compared to the diversified stock.
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When we look at value weighted figures we see that the value weighted return on
private equity — equivalently the return on the index of aggregate private equity
— ranges from 14.3 percent when all agents have low risk aversion to 17.6 percent
when they all have high risk aversion, implying a premium over the return on
the financial asset between 7 and 10 percentage points. The associated value-
weighted shares of portfolio allocated by entrepreneurial households to assets
in their business range from 44.8 to 58.6 percentage points. Table 9 reports
the fraction of agents that decide to become entrepreneur by earnings shock.
As it can be seen, in all cases that probability is close to 9 percent for agents
with the lowest earnings shock, it is between 0.1 and 0.2 percent for agents with
the intermediate shock and it is virtually 0 for agents with the highest earnings
shock. Table 10 reports the percentage of entrants that decide to do so even if
they expect a net loss from becoming an entrepreneur compared to working for
pay. This percentage is significant in all cases considered: among agents with
the lowest earnings shock — that form the vast majority of entrants — it ranges
from 10.7 percent in the low risk, low risk aversion case to 25.8 percent in the
high risk, high risk aversion case, among agents with the intermediate earnings
shock it is above 45 percent in all cases.
Summarizing, the sensitivity analysis confirms the main results obtained un-
der the baseline parametrization, that is, entry into self-employment even in the
face of a negative expected premium on the assets invested in the business com-
pared to public equity can be easily rationalized. On the other hand the assess-
ment of the private equity premium gives figures that are quite large, always
above 7 percent, leaving unexplained this finding of Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jørgensen’s (2002) paper. Entry is concentrated among agents with the lowest
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Table 8: Entrepreneurial portfolio and returns: Reduced risk of private equity.
Baseline RA=2 RA=5
Std. of returns 23.9 % 23.5 % 24.4%
Public equity return 7.0 7.0 7.0
Private equity return (equally-weighted) 4.0 1.4 6.9
Private equity return (value-weighted) 15.5 14.3 17.6
Share of private equity: (equally-weighted) 32.2 31.8 31.9
Share of private equity: (value-weighted) 53.0 58.6 44.8
Table 9: Frequency of entry by earnings shock
High risk
Baseline RA = 2 RA = 5
Low shock 8.9% 8.6% 9.0%
Intermediate shock 0.2 0.2 0.2
High shock 0.0 0.0 0.0
Low risk
Low shock 9.1 9.3 9.1
Intermediate shock 0.1 0.1 0.1
High shock 0.0 0.0 0.0
labor earnings shock, however a non negligible fraction of those who decide to
become entrepreneurs do so even if they expect a net loss in the first year of
business operation, suggesting that the option value created by the learning
mechanism is a relevant feature in the decision.
4.4 Discussion
In this section I will briefly discuss two issues. First I will compare the present
research to the one that is more closely related to it, that is, the one by Hin-
42
Table 10: Percentage of entrants with expected net loss
High risk
Baseline RA = 2 RA = 5
Low shock 20.5% 12.4% 25.8%
Intermediate shock 62.7 53.9 58.9
High shock 18.1 66.7 33.3
Low risk
Low shock 11.3 10.7 12.2
Intermediate shock 58.3 77.8 44.8
High shock 25.0 n.a. 66.7
termeier and Steinberger (2005). Second I will mention the omission of a third
safe asset from the menu of available investment options. With respect to the
first issue Hintermeier and Steinberger (2005) present a life-cycle occupational
and portfolio choice model with idiosyncratic earnings and private equity risk
to study the issue of the decision to invest in a private business. Although this
is similar to the current research the two follow radically different approaches
to model the occupational decision problem. In Hintermeier and Steinberger
(2005) the earnings process is the same in the two occupations so that indeed
the occupational choice problem is reduced to a portfolio choice problem where
the two risky assets differ in their return process and participation costs: a
one-time monetary entry cost for private equity and a very large per period
participation cost for the stock. Also in that model all agents, conditional on a
given labor earnings realization face the same distribution of private equity re-
turns which, if they decide to enter is then immediately revealed. In the current
model, on the contrary, the earnings process is different and independent across
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the two occupations so that the employment decision is a true occupational
choice, not a simple asset market participation decision. Moreover expected
business pay-offs at the time the decision to enter is made differ across agents
because different agents receive different signals. The structure of the model im-
plies that in Hintermeier and Steinberger (2005) all agents that have sufficiently
high earnings realizations and enough wealth to pay the entry cost will decide
to become entrepreneurs. In the current model this is not the case: there are
wealth and/or earnings rich households who do not consider starting a business
and poorer ones that do. The threshold level of wealth and earnings will depend
on how good the signal is. Secondly since in Hintermeier and Steinberger (2005)
the shock to earnings also enters as a component of the private equity return it
will be the households with the best labor earnings realizations that will quit
paid employment to move to self-employment. In the current model it is the
reverse: households with lower earnings realizations will require lower signals
to enter, hence they will do so more often. Under both of these dimensions the
current model is then closer to the empirical evidence: the second fact is sup-
ported for example by work of Evans and Leighton (1989) and Blanchflower and
Meyer (1994). With respect to the first fact Hurst and Lusardi (2004) found
that the probability of becoming an entrepreneur is increasing in wealth but
only slightly so: it is neither very high even for the wealthiest nor zero at low
levels of wealth. The different assumptions also have different implications for
the mechanism that generates entry even in the face of a negative excess return
on business assets compared to the stock. In Hintermeier and Steinberger (2005)
this is obtained thanks to the large per period stock market participation cost.
This cost is set at 17 percent of annual average consumption, thus making the
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choice of the stock unviable except for very wealthy agents so that for a ma-
jority of households the choice is indeed between the bond and private equity
and the latter does pay a premium on the former. In the current model in-
stead this trick is not available and all households, no matter what their wealth
is, do face the choice between investing in undiversified private equity and the
diversified stock. The key elements that explain the result are the minimum
equity requirement, the properties of the occupation specific earnings process
and the information structure implied by the learning model. The minimum eq-
uity requirement prevents households from trying at entrepreneurship without
investing financial resources in it. At the same time the fact that the earnings
process is different for the two occupations implies that an agent that received
a bad earnings shock as a worker expects better earnings in the following period
if he switches to self-employment. Second there is an option value of learning:
the agent may wait in business even in the face of a temporarily poor return on
the investment because staying is needed to collect new information about the
project which could potentially be profitable.
As in Polkovnichenko (2003) and Hopenhayn and Vereshchagina (2003) but
unlike Hintermeier and Steinberger (2005) the model presented here abstracts
from a safe asset. The main results of the paper though would not change if a
third asset was introduced. This is because such an asset would be available to
households in both occupations, hence it would not affect the relative benefits of
the two choices. Moreover it was shown that the choice to become entrepreneur
despite a negative expected premium of undiversified business equity over public
equity was obtained under a broad set of risk aversion parameters. This set
included, as a baseline, one with heterogeneous risk aversion that Gomes and
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Michaelides (2005) showed it is able to explain the observed choice between
bonds and stock in a similar life-cycle portfolio allocation model with reasonable
stock market participation costs. As a result the findings of the model do not
depend on assumptions about risk aversion that would be inconsistent with
dimensions of the household financial choices that are omitted here. Although
not relevant for the results concerning the decision to become self-employed, the
introduction of a risk free bond would clearly allow to study in more details the
portfolio choices of entrepreneurs but this is beyond the scope of the present
research.
5 Conclusions
In the present paper I have constructed a life-cycle occupational and portfolio
choice model where agents can be paid or self-employed and conditional on the
latter decide how much to allocate between business equity and a risky stock.
Self-employment is characterized by running a project whose quality is ex-ante
heterogeneous and unobservable. The uncertainty about project quality is re-
duced over time by observing the realized returns. The model is used to explore
the relationship between private equity returns and entrepreneurial choice in
light of the empirical findings of Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) and
subsequent research that tried to rationalize them. The model shows that entry
and private equity allocation for the majority of entrepreneurs can be rational-
ized even with negative expected premia on individual business investment. The
paper also provides an estimate of the required premium the index should dis-
play to rationalize the behavior of the top of the private equity distribution that
makes the largest part of the index itself and finds that this premium should
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be in the order of 10 percent thus confirming the puzzling nature of Moskowitz
and Vissing-Jørgensen’s (2002) result.
The model has some limitations, of which the most important is perhaps the
fact that our knowledge of the actual risk entailed by entrepreneurial investment
is quite limited due to the poor quality of the data, typically survey based. For
example Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) suggest a 60 percent standard
deviation of individual private equity returns.18 However that figure is based
on the average daily volatility of publicly traded stocks while private companies
are by definition non traded and there are no direct estimates of their return
volatility. In the calibration we tried to make the cross section of returns similar
to the one in the data but that does not tell us how much of it is business risk and
how much comes form fixed differences across firms. This suggests a potentially
fruitful, yet challenging, area for future research.
18This value is based on work by Campbell at al. (2001).
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Appendix
In this appendix I describe the numerical methods used to solve the model.
Computation of the model requires two separate steps: first the numerical so-
lution to the household’s dynamic programming problem and second the simu-
lation of the artificial economy.
The Numerical Dynamic Programming The optimization problem dur-
ing working age has 4 state variables. One of them, that is, the number of
signals on project quality is discrete by nature, while the remaining three are
continuous. These are the paid employment labor earnings shock z, the vari-
able describing the mean of the posterior distributions of project quality xˆ and
assets. The labor earnings shock is discretized using the method in Tauchen
(1986) and taking a 3 point grid. With respect to the variable xˆt I evaluate
the value function at 7 points. For any of these points, the law of motion (9)
and the recursive formulas (10) and (11) tell us the distribution of xˆt+1. The
integration of the RHS of the value function with respect to this distribution
is performed using 5 point Gauss-Hermite quadrature. Since the integration
points do not fall on the grid where the value function is computed I resort
to cubic spline approximation to evaluate the integral. Finally with respect to
assets I use a 65 point grid that is finer close to the origin and coarser away
from it. This is obtained by dividing the domain [d, d] into a small interval
close to the origin [d, dm] and a large interval [dm, d]. In the interval [d, dm] I
lay 25 uniformly spaced points. As for the interval [dm, d] I first take the cubic
root of its extreme points, then I lay 40 uniformly spaced points in the interval
thus obtained and finally I take the third power of those points. In this way I
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can make the intervals grow smoothly in size as we move away from the origin.
Interpolation between grid points is performed again by cubic splines.
The maximization of the RHS of the Bellman equation at each state space
point must be performed twice, once to compute the value of being an en-
trepreneur V set (dt, zt, xˆt, a) and then to compute the value of being a paid em-
ployee V pet (dt, zt, 0, 0). Then once this is done for all the state space points
the upper envelope is taken as the value function. The computation of the two
functions V set and V
pe
t implies the solution of a two variable and a one variable
maximization problem respectively. The one variable maximization problem
is performed using Brent’s parabolic interpolation method while the two vari-
able maximization is performed by exploiting the fact that for any function
g(x1, x2) we can write that maxx1,x2 g(x1, x2) = maxx1
{
maxx2 g(x1, x2)
}
and
then applying again Brent’s method along each direction. The advantage of
using Brent’s method is that its convergence is super-linear, hence it is faster
than bisection, but it does not require concavity of the objective function as
Newton-type methods, a property that is violated here because of the kinks
introduced by the occupational choice.19 The solution to the dynamic program-
ming problem delivers decision rules for occupation, consumption and holding
of each of the two assets.
The Simulation The economy is simulated as an Overlapping Generation
model. This means that I take a set of 10000 agents and simulate the evolution
of the economy for 1100 periods. As agents reach real age 35 a new agent that
we may think as the descendant is introduced in the economy. Since a few agents
do not reach the age of 35 some new agents are introduced in each period to
19See Brent (1973) for an illustration of the method.
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keep the population constant. The first 600 periods are discarded, then every
25 periods I extract a cross section and compute the relevant statistics on that
cross section. Results presented in the paper are obtained by averaging over the
20 cross section thus sampled.20
An important issue in the simulation is the way actual decisions are com-
puted. Normally the most straightforward way of performing the simulation
is to use piecewise linear interpolation of the decision rules. In the case of the
present model though the need to treat the variable xˆ as a continuum introduces
some complications. In particular there will be numerous instances where the
occupational decision switches when moving from the grid point xˆi to the next
one xˆi+1. Given that the distribution of the xˆ variables is log normal there is no
obvious way how to randomize and assign arbitrarily the participation decision
in these cases. For this reason when such cases occur I compute the simu-
lated decisions by resolving the optimization problem using the value function
obtained in the dynamic programming stage. When instead the occupational
decision does not switch between two state space points I resort to the usual
piecewise linear interpolation. This method, although safe, slows the program
quite considerably, to the point that the time of a single simulation is in the
order of the hours. This must be taken into account when considering some of
the simplifying modeling choices adopted in the paper and the fact that the cal-
ibration of parameters chosen to match some key statistics of the US economy
does not occur through a systematic search over a grid but by a rougher trial
and error procedure.21
20To check the stability of results the model was also simulated for 2000 periods discarding
the first 1500 and delivered results that are almost identical to the one reported in the paper.
21Observe that in the model there are 4 parameters that are calibrated to match some
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